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Generalities of the Fourth Amendment
Lloyd L. Weinrebt
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The fourth amendment is one of the Constitution's richly gen-
erative texts. Its important terms are general. The scope of the main
clause is given by a catalogue that reaches for comprehensiveness:
"persons, houses, papers, and effects." The amendment invites
treatment as a broad statement about the relationship between an
individual and the government. When the government can accom-
plish a social purpose only by limiting the autonomy of some person,
there is not simply a current choice to be made between public and
private purposes. The value of personal autonomy is given perma-
nence and secured against the changing demands of social policy.
Except in the second clause, which is a rather narrow prescrip-
tion about the form and content of search warrants,' the fourth
amendment does not answer specific questions. While its manifest
purpose is to restrict searches by the government that invade indi-
vidual privacy, equally clearly it allows some searches, those that
are not "unreasonable." A thoughtful and strict grammarian might
conclude from the structure of the amendment that the second
clause is a partial explication of the first, so that any search con-
ducted without a warrant is, by that fact alone, unreasonable. But if
grammar were followed in that direction, one would have to con-
clude also that the amendment does not deal at all with, say, an ar-
resting officer's authority to protect himself by removing weapons
from an arrested person's pockets; if that is a search, it is obviously
not one to which a blanket requirement of a warrant could apply,
because arrests must often be made without advance notice. An-
t Professor of Law, Harvard University.
1. Even this prescription leaves many questions unanswered: who may issue a warrant,
how it must be executed, in what circumstances seized property may be retained, and so
forth.
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other grammarian might conclude that the first clause stated a con-
dition for application of the second, so that there was a requirement
that a search not be "unreasonable" independent of the particular
requirements of the warrant clause. Before 1967, that view had doc-
trinal, albeit largely ineffective, support. Since then, interpretation
of the warrant clause has not depended at all on the language that
precedes it.2
The courts have said little of lasting significance about the rela-
tionship between the two clauses. In 1948, the Supreme Court said
plainly that the warrant clause was central to the constitutional
scheme and a primary defense against unreasonable searches. "It
is a cardinal rule that, in seizing goods and articles, law enforcement
agents must secure and use search warrants wherever reasonably
practicable.... To provide the necessary security against unreason-
able intrusions upon the private lives of individuals, the framers of
the Fourth Amendment required adherence to judicial processes
wherever possible."3 Twenty months later, the warrant clause was
assigned a smaller role:
A rule of thumb requiring that a search warrant always be
procured whenever practicable may be appealing from the van-
tage point of easy administration. But we cannot agree that this
requirement should be crystallized into a sine qua non to the rea-
sonableness of a search....
.... The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to pro-
cure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.
That criterion in turn depends upon the facts and circum-
stances-the total atmosphere of the case.4
More recently, in 1969 the Court declared: "The Amendment
was in large part a reaction to the general warrants and warrant-
less searches that had so alienated the colonists and had helped
speed the movement for independence. In the scheme of the
Amendment, therefore, the requirement that 'no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause,' plays a crucial part. '5 Presently,
the Court has turned again to reasonableness as the "ultimate
standard,' 6 and declared "the test to be, not whether it was rea-
sonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search itself
was reasonable . . . . "'i Such statements, which casually reject or
2. See text and notes at notes 67-69 infra.
3. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948).
4. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65, 66 (1950).
5. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969) (footnote omitted).
6. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973).
7. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807 (1974).
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disregard what was said before and treat the Warrant clause either
as an insignificant hurdle or as a deus ex machina with which to
strike down a disfavored search, do no more than announce the
latest shift of emphasis to one clause or the other, according to a
result reached on other grounds.
We should not regret that the constitutional language does not
deal concretely with our current problems, nor be surprised that its
accepted interpretation has changed from time to time. It is both
regrettable and surprising that the courts have said so little of any
substance about the principles of the amendment when they have
considered and reconsidered its application in different circum-
stances. The absence of a continuously developing rationalization of
the amendment has enabled the Court to change direction, even to
veer rapidly and sharply, without too obvious inconsistency; but the
result is a body of doctrine that is unstable and unconvincing.
In the past five years, the Supreme Court has handed down at
least sixteen major opinions interpreting the fourth amendment.8
None of them was decided by a unanimous Court. The Court has
had to acknowledge repeatedly that "this branch of the law is some-
thing less than a seamless web."9 So we have the opinions of five Jus-
tices in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,'0 which occupy eighty-five pages
of the United States Reports in lengthy discussions of fourth amend-
ment issues; the only issue about which the Justices could agree was
unnecessary to a decision of the case.I' So we have the Aguilar-Spin-
elli-Harris12 series dealing with the requirement of probable cause
8. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165 (1969); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573
(1971); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291
(1973); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973) (with Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973)); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); United States v. Edwards, 415
U.S. 800 (1974).
To these might be added: Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); United States v. Biswell, 406
U.S. 311 (1972); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (stop and frisk); United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223
(1973); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (border search).
Among the latter cases, Brown was decided unanimously. There were no dissenting
opinions in Frazier or United States District Court.
9. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973).
10. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
11. See id. at 484-90 (Stewart, J., for the Court). Even on that issue, Justice White con-
curred only in the result. Id. at 510.
12. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969);
United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971). To these might be added, among others:
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for issuance of a search warrant, each case reinterpreting what went
before. So we have the see-saw between Rabinowitz and Chimel about
the role of the warrant clause. 13 So we have the shifts from Wolf'4
to Mapp15 to Calandra,16 in which the exclusionary rule, on which
judicial involvement mostly depends, is traded back and forth like
a hostage in the substantive dispute. 17 We have less common under-
standing of the fourth amendment now than there was a hundred
years ago, not so much because we have perceived hitherto hidden
problems as because we have sought results without attending to
the task of understanding.
The first requirement is that we understand what the amendment
protects. Rarely have the courts said more than that a search was or
was not an "invasion of privacy" that was or was not "reasonable."
In Katz v. United States,' 8 the Supreme Court observed that con-
clusory references to "governmental intrusion" on a "right to pri-
vacy" explain little,' 9 and made a start toward unpacking the con-
crete significance of those phrases; but nothing that the Court has
said since has continued along those lines. The second requirement
is that we develop an approach to the scheme of the amendment-
when a warrant is required and when not-that can be applied con-
sistently in varying circumstances.
I
A
The central theme of the amendment is its prohibition against
general searches, the evil that its authors had foremost in mind. The
"generality" of a search is not a matter simply of the scope of a
search and the size of the area searched, both of which are touched
by the warrant clause. Particularity is a function of purpose.2 0 The
Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257
(1960); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
13. See text and notes at notes 3-6 supra, 72-95 infra.
14. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
15. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
16. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
17. This article does not discuss the exclusionary rule, which is a second-order inquiry
about what to do in a criminal case if the right protected by the fourth amendment is violated.
It is scarcely surprising, however, that the answers that have been given to that inquiry are
unpersuasive, since the answers to the primary inquiry are unsatisfactory.
18. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
19. Id. at 350.
20. In other contexts, references to "New York City" and "all items belonging to John
Doe" might be regarded as "particularly describing" a place and a set of things, but they do
not satisfy the warrant clause.
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prohibition is above all a limitation on the occasions when the gov-
ernment may search. Searches of private places are excluded from
the government's ordinary powers; the government may intrude on
privacy in that way only if there is special need that can be stated
with particularity. What the fourth amendment most clearly prohib-
its are practices like random entries into people's homes or random
searches of people on the street for general governmental purposes:
to acquire information, or to prevent danger to the public, or to look
for evidence of wrongdoing, or simply to remind people that the
government is the source of all their blessings. Privacy is not a good
that we hold at the pleasure of the government.
We do have security from that kind of intrusion to an extraordi-
nary extent, so much so that it may be difficult to imagine what a
"private" place could be if it did not afford at least that much privacy
by right (and not merely, by calculated risk, in fact). A right to ex-
clude others, however, need not incorporate a right to exclude pub-
lic officials. Living together as densely as most of us do, we increas-
ingly entrust tasks of communal living to the government, which
strains the assumption that officials also ordinarily may not enter.
The strain is evident in cases like Camara v. Municipal Court,21 in
which the manifest necessity for social control over certain basic
matters of public health led the Supreme Court to accept an atten-
uated warrant procedure for health inspections that went far toward
making government officials' entry into private homes a part of the
regular performance of their duties. Stricter adherence to the letter
of the fourth amendment would have led to an impractical syl-
logism: the fourth amendment prohibits searches of this kind;
searches of this kind are manifestly necessary given these housing
conditions; therefore these housing conditions cannot be allowed to
continue. The strain is also evident in Wyman v. James,2 2 in which the
Court held that welfare officials could "visit" the homes of welfare
recipients in the course of the welfare program. Notwithstanding
all the Court's arguments to the contrary, if the provision of welfare
benefits is now an ordinary function of government-as the number
of recipients suggests-the holding was contrary to the fourth
amendment.2 3
21. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
22. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
23. The Court's opinion emphasized the noncriminal nature of the inspection. Id. at
322-23. Historically, though not wholly consistently, there has been a distinction between ad-
ministrative searches of this kind and searches in aid of criminal investigation. The Court
has authorized the former more readily than the latter. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S.
311 (1972); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S.
360 (1959).
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That we do generally protect the security of private places from
governmental intrusion is especially worth our attention because
in another respect we do not value it so highly. The fourth amend-
ment makes no promise to anyone that he will have a house or
effects. Persons are secure in the privacy of their houses if they have
houses, secure in the privacy of other private places if they are able
to enter them. The amendment rests on the premise that individuals
will acquire and hold private property. It does not oblige the gov-
ernment to create private places or confer privacy.24
Whether there is inconsistency in the two positions depends on
one's starting point. If privacy is the primary value, the positions
look in opposite directions. If private property, or more simply
property, is primary, the guarantee of its protection from govern-
mental intrusion has no implication (or may even have a negative
implication) for the situation of those without property. When the
amendment was framed, the difference between the two positions
was bridged by a political philosophy and view of the community ac-
cording to which it was possible for any deserving person to ac-
quire property.
The intrusions that the fourth amendment restricts are para-
digmatically physical acts: entering a place, searching it, taking and
removing things.25 The government's agents are not ordinarily to
enter private places and surprise us or observe us there. Nor are
they to enter private places in our absence and take note of (or just
take) what is there. These two aspects of privacy are distinct and
protect different features of our lives.
Privacy of Presence. The fourth amendment assures us that when
we are in a private place we are, so far as the government is con-
cerned, in private. This assurance is ambulatory; it arises simply
from being present in a private place. It is also transient; when we
are no longer present in a place, w& lose the interest in preventing
an intrusion in that place that we held while there. 26 Privacy of pres-
ence allows us to keep our conduct of a portion of our lives from
public view. It enables us to do the things that we like to do but do
24. But cf. text following note 108 infra.
25. Of course, to say that physical acts are the paradigm is to indicate that they do not ex-
haust the category. Refusing at one point to extend the paradigm, the Supreme Court made
the rhetorical mistake of asserting that it was really a definition. See Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928).
26. We may have reason to protect the interest of someone else who is still present; but it
is the latter's interest in privacy that is or is not protected.
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badly, things that we are a bit embarrassed about doing: to meet a
friend quietly, to act out love and hate, to do all the things that we
should not do in the same way at high noon in Times Square. Be-
cause privacy of presence accompanies us wherever we are in pri-
vate, it preserves the autonomy of a person's life without confining
him to a small area that is privately his. It applies the distinction be-
tween private conduct and public performance, as a person may
choose, over a large portion of his life.
Privacy of Place. The fourth amendment's assurance that a par-
ticular place will not be exposed to public view without one's consent
is neither ambulatory nor transient.27 It is not created by entering
a place, nor is it lost by leaving. Privacy of place does not protect
from exposure a person's conduct so much as what is permanent
about him. It allows us to extend our personality by stamping it on a
place without displaying it publicly. It allows us to leave our pajamas
on the floor, the bed unmade and dishes in the sink, pictures of
secret heroes on the wall, a stack of comic books or love letters on
the shelf; it allows us to be sloppy or compulsively neat, to enjoy
what we have without exposing our tastes to the world.
Ordinarily we need not be careful to distinguish these two kinds
of privacy. A person's home is a place that he expects will not be
invaded whether he is present or absent. We may have the same ex-
pectation about a few other places: an office or shop or car. Al-
though this dual privacy does not cover much of the whole world
for any of us, circumstances usually tell us which kind of privacy
may be expected. We do not expect to leave our pajamas unob-
served in a public restaurant or on a bus; nor do we expect a friend
or the proprietor of a restaurant to solicit our approval before he
allows someone to enter his premises when we are not there. The
difference between privacy of presence and privacy of place is,
however, as important as ordinarily it is obvious.
Suppose that you were observed wherever you were except when
you were in your own private place, your home. Wherever you went
-on the street, in shops, in the home of a friend, in restaurants,
theaters, parks-someone watched what you did and heard what
you said. Suppose that other persons were similarly observed, so
that when they were in your home they were seen and heard. Al-
27. One can, of course, move one's private places about; a car, a suitcase, and a trousers
pocket are all places where one may have privacy of place, whether or not one is present in
the place or has it "on his person." But one cannot acquire privacy of place in another per-
son's pocket by sticking a hand in it. It is in that sense that privacy in unfixed places is "neither
ambulatory nor transient." Houses too can be moved from place to place.
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ternatively, suppose that your conduct was not observed at all; but
that whenever you were not at home, government officials roamed
there at will and examined your belongings, without taking any-
thing. In the first case, we should expect the home, its contents, and
solitary conduct within it to assume more importance in the preser-
vation and expression of personal identity. In the second, we should
expect that the home and what is permanent in it would become
less important and that personal identity would be maintained pri-
marily by one's conduct. The two kinds of intrusion overlap; no
doubt a society that was prepared to allow one would be more likely
to allow the other as well. But they interfere with distinct aspects of
autonomy, and threaten our lives in different ways. In circum-
stances in which only one is involved, the constitutional result may
depend on which one it is.
B
Cases in which authority to search is based on consent are usually
analyzed as a minor division within the large category of searches
without a warrant or as a small category of their own. As a reflec-
tion of police conduct, that makes sense. "Consensual searches" do
not appear often in the reports, for the obvious reason that consent
is not so likely to be asked or given if there is something to be found
that will be harmful to the person whose consent is needed. Some
other basis for a search-a warrant or one of the doctrines that dis-
penses with the warrant requirement-is usually available. Those
bases do not define the privacies protected by the fourth amend-
ment so much as they specify when and how the protection is over-
come. A person's consent, however, is relevant only to the extent
that he has a protected interest. Therefore, the scope of a search
that consent legitimates is congruent with the realm of privacy
that the consent waives. By noting the circumstances in which con-
sent to a search is necessary and sufficient, we can identify the con-
tours of the privacies the fourth amendment protects.28
Just as the fourth amendment makes no special provision for
those who lack a private place or the means of entry into one, it does
not insist that persons preserve a privacy that they are willing to
28. Another group of cases that delineate the protected privacies are those in which offi-
cial conduct is held to be outside the protected area because the conduct occurred "in public"
or "on public property." Until recently, such cases have generally been decided without dis-
cussion about what makes a place "public" or "private" for purposes of the fourth amend-
ment. Since I believe, on the basis of the arguments I have just made about privacy of pres-
ence and privacy of place, that that distinction may become questionable in this context, I
have postponed discussion of it. See text and notes at notes 101-08 infra.
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forego. The amendment does not provide that police and other
government officials shall not enter at all; it does not, for example,
prevent the owner of a house from inviting a police officer to make
an inspection (although there might be such a rule in a paternalistic
society that placed a high value on solitude).29 Since the fourth
amendment does not provide a means for obtaining privacy to those
who lack it, it would be peculiar if the amendment forced privacy
on those who choose to give it up.
A homeowner who invites the police to make a search which turns
out to be contrary to his interests will probably regret having made
the invitation; and he may slide easily from wishing that he had not
done so to believing that he did not. He will slide even more easily
if it is not claimed that he invited the inspection but only that he
acceded to a request. On the other hand, a police officer who is
eager to search may convince himself easily that the homeowner
has consented, and even more easily recall the consent after he has
found what he was looking for.
When there is a dispute whether a person voluntarily surrendered
an interest in privacy that he undoubtedly had, the difficulty is not
simply that the only witnesses will probably report (in good faith
or not) different recollections of what happened. Often the diffi-
culty would remain even if we had taken a motion picture and
sound track of everything that took place. In ordinary discourse
we lack a precise understanding of what constitutes "consent." It
is a particularly open concept, which refers to both an "internal"
state of mind and an "external" performance; consent is unequivo-
cal and unquestioned only when it includes both. Some courts, at-
tending to the state of mind, and reasoning that "no sane man"
would consent to a search that was sure to turn up evidence he
wanted concealed, have concluded that whatever the appearance
of consent from a person's conduct, he did not "in fact" consent
unless he did not know that the evidence was there to be found.30
Other courts have regarded a man's conduct as a sufficient mani-
festation of his state of mind or, what is the same thing, have con-
29. Invitations to "private" places are not allowed when the value to be served by isola-
tion is not dependent on individuals' choice. Prisoners, for example, are not allowed to invite
whom they will to their cell.
30. [N]o sane man who denies his guilt would actually be willing that policemen search
his room for contraband which is certain to be discovered. It follows that when police
identify themselves as such, search a room, and find contraband in it, the occupant's
words or signs of acquiescence in the search, accompanied by denial of guilt, do not show
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cluded that his undisclosed "internal" opposition to the search is
irrelevant.31
The first position goes too far to equate a preference with a lack
of consent; we often consent to conduct of another although we wish
it would not take place. On the other hand, a rule that words ex-
pressing consent are always to be taken at face value exalts the form
of consent over its substance. We cannot give much weight to Mr.
Jones's invitation to search if he extends the invitation to a police-
man sitting on his chest and pounding his head on the steps. (The
actual facts, of course, are likely to be more ambiguous.) We can-
not specify in advance what constitutes too much or inappropri-
ate pressure (which vitiates consent) and what are merely unplea-
sant circumstances that make consent relevant. Afterwards, if it
turns out that it was unwise to have given consent, the homeowner
is likely to conclude that it was pressure and not his own foolish-
ness that led him to act, and he will recall sources of pressure
whether or not he felt them at the time.
Potential sources of pressure, real or retrospectively fancied, are
abundant in a confrontation between a police officer and an indi-
vidual. The police are designedly the society's agents for the appli-
cation of force. The issue came into focus for the courts in cases in
which the defendant, following Miranda's3 2 lead, argued that his
apparent consent was not "voluntary" because it was not shown that
he had known he could withhold consent. Some courts agreed that
consent given ignorantly was not voluntary.33 But in Schneckloth v.
consent; at least in the absence of some extraordinary circumstance, such as ignorance
that contraband is present.
Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1954). See also, e.g., United States v.
Viale, 312 F.2d 595, 601 (2d Cir. 1963).
31. [The defendant] argues that since it is incredible he would freely have consented
to a search which he knew would disclose incriminating evidence, his words of consent
should be considered an involuntary submission to authority and therefore insufficient
to waive a constitutional right. Acceptance of this contention ... not only would almost
destroy the principle permitting a search on consent but would enable experienced
criminals to lay traps for officers who, relying on the words of consent, failed to secure a
search warrant that would have been theirs for the asking. Where... no force or decep-
tion was either used or threatened, we see no reason why a court should disregard a sus-
pect's expression of consent simply because efficient and lawful investigation and his
own attempt to avoid apprehension had produced a situation where he could hardly
avoid giving it.
United States v. Gorman, 355 F.2d 151, 158-59 (2d Cir. 1965) (footnotes omitted). See also
Robbins v. MacKenzie, 364 F.2d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 1966): "Bowing to events, even if one is not
happy about them, is not the same thing as being coerced."
32. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), established elaborate requirements to en-
sure that an arrested person's confession to the police was given voluntarily.
'33. E.g., Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 412 U.S. 218
(1973); United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966).
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Bustamonte,34 the Supreme Court held to the contrary and adopted
a rule that "voluntariness"--the absence of undue pressures-in-
volves "a question of fact to be determined from a totality of all the
circumstances.
35
The Court's result is sound enough as abstract doctrine. But in
the context of a criminal prosecution, the answer to the question
the Court prescribed is not merely a finding of fact to be made as
firmly as circumstances allow; the inquiry has functional significance
and must be resolved unequivocally. Yet the concept of voluntari-
ness is no more definite than the concept of consent. We lack a firm
principle for deciding in varying circumstances whether ignorance
of a highly relevant fact deprives consent of voluntariness. The
product of Schneckloth is likely to be still another series of fourth
amendment cases in which the courts provide a lengthy factual de-
scription followed by a conclusion (most likely, in the current cli-
mate, that consent was voluntarily given), without anything to con-
nect the two.
The beginning of a solution to the problem is to prevent it from
arising when one can. When a search pursuant to a warrant would
be constitutional, a warrant can almost always be obtained. The wise
course for the police is not to rely on the consent of a private per-
son unless they must. When the police do rely on consent, either
(1) they could not have obtained a warrant because a constitutional
requirement like probable cause was not met; or (2) they could
have obtained a warrant but did not; or (3) the constitutional re-
quirements were met, but the police could not obtain a warrant
for other reasons, such as the unavailability of a magistrate.
In the first two situations, the courts should place a heavy burden
of proving consent on the police: in the first case because the Con-
stitution explicitly prefers the private person's interest to society's
and in the second because the police could have avoided the dispute
by obtaining a warrant. Also, being professionally involved and hav-
ing initiated the incident, the police are better able than the private
person to plan the encounter so that if consent is given, proof of
it will be available. In the third situation, the police stand on firmer
ground. They can plausibly argue that if a warrant that would or-
34. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
35. Id. at 227. The majority observed accurately enough that conduct is not ordinarily
deemed involuntary just because the actor is not fully aware. Id. at 223-34. But if the police
must meaningfully advise a person that he can refuse to allow them to search, they may com-
municate more than the bare information and reduce the coercive element of these situations.
That aspect gives added point to Justice Marshall's argument in dissent that the majority's
approach confines the fourth amendment's protection "to the sophisticated, the knowl-
edgeable, and ... the few." Id. at 277, 289.
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dinarily and properly have been issued was unobtainable, the sit-
uation was an emergency. 36 If the police also do what they reason-
ably can to minimize their use of force and authority, and if con-
sent to the search is not explicitly withheld, the search should be
sustained on that basis.
A solution like the one offered in Schneckloth, which depends on
retrospective determination of the consenting person's state of
mind, is unlikely to be satisfactory however ample the facts on which
the determination is based. It will nt provid! a convincing outcome
in particular cases nor convincing distinctions among cases that are
decided differently. The way out is rather to reformulate the ques-
tion, within the constitutional framework, in terms of the consenting
person's actions and the actions of the police.
The living arrangements of most people are too complex for a
person's consent always to be necessary or sufficient to overcome the
constitutional protection. We live with our families or roommates;
we share our premises for long or short periods, on a more or less
equal basis. A search is likely to interrupt the privacy of several peo-
ple or to invade the privacy of others who are absent. If the person
against whom evidence is used has consented to the search, he him-
self cannot complain even if the rights of others have been violated.
Usually the courts have had to deal with the issue of consent to
search a common dwelling in situations in which, one person having
consented, another person is prosecuted and objects to the introduc-
tion of evidence found in the search.
In United States v. Matlock,37 the Supreme Court's fullest and most
recent statement about the issue, a woman admitted police officers
to a room in which she lived with the defendant; evidence found in
a closet of the room was used against him at trial. The Court upheld
the search, stating the accepted rule that "consent of one who pos-
sesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against
the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is
shared.'38 If "authority" meant simply authority to admit the
searchers, the rule would be empty. The Court explained:
36. The police cannot claim that there was an emergency if they simply disregard the
warrant procedure whenever a warrant would issue or if there is no reasonable provision for
obtaining a warrant in ordinary circumstances. There must, therefore, be some regularly
available procedure that is unavailable in the particular case.
37. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
38. Id. at 170. The Court correctly rejected automatic application of concepts of posses-
sion borrowed from the law of property, which have different functional significance. Fourth
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[A]uthority which justifies the third-party consent.., rests...
on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint
access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to
recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit
the inspection in his own right and that the others have as-
sumed the risk that one of their number might permit the com-
mon area to be searched.39
The Court's conclusion and its reasoning so far as it goes are cor-
rect, but more than its brief reference to assumption of a risk is
needed to show why.
The explanation requires application of the principle that the
fourth amendment protects the privacy one otherwise has with-
out creating or expanding spheres of privacy, and recognition of
the difference between privacy of presence and privacy of place.
Just as the fourth amendment is uninterested in the lack of privacy
of persons who do not have access to private property and the sur-
render of privacy by one who voluntarily exposes to public view
what he might have kept private, so it is uninterested in the partial
lack of privacy of one who, by necessity or choice, shares premises
on an equal or inferior basis with another. Because we so easily
think about privacy concretely as the equivalent of private prop-
erty, it is easy for us to think that a person who shares private
property retains complete privacy of place, just as we may assume
that a person who has no property has no privacy of place what-
ever, even though he retains the capacity to be in private on the
property of others. But in the same way that the Constitution does
not confer any privacy on persons who wholly lack private prop-
erty or access to it, the Constitution does not allow persons who
have a privacy limited by sharing to claim a privacy beyond that
limit.
To recognize limits on a person's privacy in shared living ar-
rangements is not to say that anyone who does not live alone has
no protection from the entrance of public officials, any more than
the shared arrangement entitles all private persons to enter at
will. But if the arrangement includes the authority of either party
to admit whom he will and thus expose the premises, that limita-
tion on the privacy of each covers public officials, who also may
enter on the authority of either. Ordinarily, if two persons share
an apartment on equal terms, either may admit anyone he
amendment privacies should not depend on ownership arrangements that are made for tax
or mortgage or other purposes and that the parties never think about otherwise.
39. Id. at 171 n.7.
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chooses to the living room; either, then, may admit the police to
search the living room.
Reference to the privacy that one has rather than to the property
that one owns gives answers which we instinctively feel are correct.
We should not be surprised if a homeowner consented to a search
of his living room in the absence of a weekend guest; but it would
violate our ordinary understanding of their temporary living ar-
rangement if the guest admitted strangers in the absence of his host.
It does not startle us that a parent's consent to a search of the living
room in the absence of his minor child is given effect; but we should
not allow the police to rely on the consent of the child to bind the
parent. The common sense of the matter is that the host or parent
has not surrendered his privacy of place in the living room to the
discretion of the guest or child; rather, the latter have privacy of
place there in the discretion of the former.
There are other cases in which instinct fails and analysis is not so
easy. Legal rights frequently are a good clue to actual relationships,
but frequently they are not. The actual living arrangements that
people make are more idiosyncratic and more complex and indef-
inite than an "ordinary" weekend visit. Explicit definition of a liv-
ing arrangement is not as common as a process of continued ac-
commodation and forebearance. When an elderly uncle comes to
live with his affectionate niece and her husband, for example, the
modus vivendi is more likely to be a product of trial and error (and
some tribulation) than of a carefully elaborated code. Children
gradually acquire discretion to admit whom they will on their own
authority; elderly parents who live with their children's families
gradually lose it. A guest remains, begins to pay a share of the gro-
cery bill, and finally "sends for his things."
Yet another complication is that "premises" are not indivisible.
Some portions of premises are shared more than others and in dif-
ferent ways; some are shared wholly and some not at all. Although
the uncle may be careful to ask his hiece whether he and his cronies
can play gin rummy in the living room,40 he is not so likely to ask
whom he may invite into his own room. He may not expect to be
consulted about his niece's invitations generally; but he would be
startled if she held a meeting of the garden club in his room. It is
not always a matter of rooms. His desk may be in the living room.
Nor are the labels on "premises" always unequivocal. The niece may
regularly enter her uncle's room to clean it and open the drawers
40. To which she may reply: "Of course. You don't have to ask," although she would be
surprised and annoyed if they all appeared in the living room without an advance request.
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in his dresser to put his clothes away, without having discretion to
allow others to rummage through his clothes.
The most difficult case is also the most common and the one most
likely to arouse strong feelings: admission of the police by one
spouse, usually the wife, to search premises shared with the spouse
who is absent.41 The intimate relationship between husband and
wife makes it difficult to say how far each has preserved a privacy
not subject to the discretion of the other. There will be areas in
which each has no expectation of privacy with respect to the other
but has a full expectation of privacy as to the rest of the world. Such
a joint privacy from which everyone else is excluded is a part of in-
timacy. There are also areas, however, into which each may bring
friends and on occasion strangers. The ordinary assumption about
a living room, for example, would be that either husband or wife
could admit persons in the absence of the other and without prior
approval.
If a search is defended on the ground that one spouse consented
to it, I see no way to avoid the question whether the consenting per-
son had, in relation to his spouse, enough control over the area
searched to make the consent effective. Whose crime the police were
investigating cannot be determinative; the amendment secures us
against invasions of privacy, not the discovery of incriminating evi-
dence. 42 Nothing in the fourth amendment prohibits a wife from
allowing the police to search her handbag, even if they are looking
for information against her husband. Equally plainly, her consent
would not be a sufficient basis for them to search his briefcase, even
if they were looking for evidence against her.
The validity of consent does not depend on a theory of agency, by
which the absent spouse is presumed to have conferred authority
to admit the police in his behalf. The authority exercised by the
present spouse is her own, the same authority with which she ad-
mits other people. While there is no reason why one spouse cannot
make the other his agent to admit the police (or anyone else) to prem-
ises over which the former alone has authority, even a spouse's ex-
press instruction or request not to admit the police (or anyone
41. Whether clinging to notions of Southern chivalry or for some other reason, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held until 1970 that a wife's consent was
not effective to bind her husband, although his could bind her. See United States v. Thomp-
son, 421 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1970), overruling, e.g., Gurleski v. United States, 405 F.2d 253,
261 (5th Cir. 1968).
42. The one point that did unite the Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971) (see text and note at note 11 supra), was that the fourth amendment does not
prevent a wife from delivering to the police incriminating items belonging to her husband.
403 U.S. at 484-90.
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else) to shared premises would not be effective to invalidate con-
sent that did not depend on his authority in the first place; what
does not exist by his dispensation cannot be removed by his com-
mand.43
Most often, the ordinary living arrangements will be a good guide
to particular arrangements-that is part of what it means to say that
arrangements are ordinary. -So, without special information one
would suppose that husband and wife have independent authority
to admit persons to the living room and the kitchen, and probably
the bathroom and bedroom;44 neither would have authority to ad-
mit persons to the other's study or desk or closet; and so forth. But,
by long practice and understanding, the kitchen may be the wife's
private place to which no one outside the family is ever admitted
without her approval. Or the husband's "study" may be nothing
more than a gratifying label for a room that the entire family uses
as they will. If people make arrangements that are not ordinary or
call rooms by names that do not describe actual use, their own ways
of doing things are what count. There is as little reason under the
fourth amendment to bind people by "ordinary" arrangements that
are not their own as there is to bind those who have a great many
houses or none at all by the amount of privacy that people "ordinari-
ly" acquire.
The same approach explains the difference in result if more than
one person is present when the police request permission to make
a search.45 Again, certain cases seem clear. Although the patrons of
a store or restaurant have an interest in the privacy of their pres-
ence there, we should not expect their objection to entry to prevail
if the owner gives his consent. Nor could the guests at a party over-
come their host's consent to the entry of the police, although if he
43. Ordinarily, we should expect such an instruction or request to be followed, but not
because the spouse who received it had no authority to do otherwise.
Some courts have been troubled by cases in which the consenting spouse has an immediate
interest antagonistic to the absent spouse. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz,
431 F.2d 839, 842-43 (3d Cir. 1970). If the antagonism has not affected their actual living
arrangement, it should make no difference. Often, of course, it would produce a harder,
clearer division of the premises, and separate control of each spouse over his or her portion;
if that happened, the authority of each to admit the police, or other outsiders, would be af-
fected.
44. Almost certainly, guests would be admitted more frequently to the first two rooms
than to the second two. Some rooms are used more privately than others, an aspect of living
arrangements that the Supreme Court's dealings with the fourth amendment have ignored.
See text at note 66 infra. Usually, the difference merely reflects the varying uses of the rooms
rather than a lack of authority to admit for an appropriate Mise.
45. The holding in Matlock, for example, applies only to consent that binds "the absent,
nonconsenting person." 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974) (emphasis added).
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were a good host he might honor their objection and withhold his
consent.
The distinction between privacy of presence and privacy of place
is relevant in such cases. If one's privacy while present someplace is
derivative of and dependent on the privacy of another, that relation-
ship also determines the former's privacy with respect to an entry by
the police. When two or more persons have equal use of a place in
which both are present, the consent of one does not normally elimi-
nate the need for the consent of the other(s) before a search is made;
ordinarily, persons with equal "rights" in a place would accommo-
date each other by not admitting persons over another's objection
while he was present.46
Hard cases arise often, because people living agreeably together
usually do not arrive at explicit, regular practices; they proceed by
understandings that are most satisfactory if they are imprecise, flexi-
ble, and unstated. But there is no other approach that is true to the
policy of the fourth amendment. One extreme alternative would be
a rule that any person or persons who are alone at premises to be
searched can allow the police to enter, notwithstanding the opposi-
tion of absent others; but that rule, contrary to common under-
standing, would allow a babysitter to admit the police for a search
while the parents were out.47 At the other extreme would be a rule
that no person or persons who are alone at premises can allow the
police to enter if any other person who lives at those premises is ab-
sent and has not given his consent; the niece or her husband would
not be able to admit the police to their living room without the
consent of her absent uncle (or even the absent housekeeper who
lives in a room on the third floor and sometimes uses the living-
room).48 The only other alternative within these extremes is a re-
46. One can imagine a living arrangement in which each held his privacy of presence
subject to the wishes of the others, so that any one of them could admit whomever he chose
at any time. If each indeed regularly admitted persons over the others' objections, the po-
lice also would have to be admitted on that basis. That result would stretch the proposed
analysis to the limit of its logic; its peculiarity lies in the living pattern itself.
47. The babysitter's consent was relied on in People v. Misquez, 152 Cal. App. 2d 471,
313 P.2d 206 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957), evidently on the mistaken basis of apparent au-
thority. Cf. text at notes 42-43 supra; People v. Carswell, 149 Cal. App. 2d 395, 308 P.2d
852 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (police admitted by housepainter; search invalid).
A still more extreme rule would be that any person who is present, notwithstanding the op-
position of any others absent or present, could authorize a police entry. This rule would allow
the babysitter to admit the police despite the presence of a vociferously objecting home-
owner.
48. Still more extreme would be a rule that all persons who live at the premises and all
persons who are present at the time must consent to the entry. This rule would require all
the guests at a party (or, at the limit, all the patrons of a restaurant) to agree to an entry by
the police.
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turn to property law concepts of title and possessory interests,
which are remote from the purposes of the fourth amendment.
A consequence of this approach is that the police will sometimes
obtain evidence against a person that he himself would not have
given them. But it is no part of the purpose of the fourth amend-
ment simply to shelter criminals from the discovery of evidence of
their crimes. On the other hand, the approach is plainly a poor basis
for advising the police when to rely on the cooperation of the lady or
man of the house or their elderly uncle or anyone else. That is
simply a reflection of the complexity of our patterns of communal
living, which in turn determine the kinds and degrees of privacy
that we have.
In United States v. Matlock, the Supreme Court stated that it did
not reach the question whether searching officers' reasonable belief
that authority to consent was valid was sufficient to uphold a
search.4 9 The answer to the question is clearly no. "Apparent au-
thority" to consent is not by itself a basis for sustaining a search, al-
though a good faith effort to obtain consent may help to sustain a
claim that there was a sufficient emergency to overcome the require-
ment of a warrant.50 Except in the emergency situation, when the
police mistakenly rely on apparent consent, they are not denied
something that the Constitution says they should have, but some-
thing that the Constitution says they should not have. Since there is
a prescribed procedure-an application for a warrant-for all that
they are allowed to do, the police have no reliance interest worthy of
protection. 51 The only sensible guide for the police is that they
should never rely on consent as the basis for a search unless they
must. If they do search relying on consent, they should be prepared
to meet a heavy burden of proof that consent was in fact meaning-
fully given. And even then, because of the difficulties of proof, they
should expect to be told often that the search was not proper.
C
The explanatory value of specific reference to privacy of presence
and privacy of place is evident in three situations that have troubled
the courts and commentators and that the Supreme Court's general
49. 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974).
50. See text and note at note 36 supra.
51. If the police are instructed to rely on consent, they do have a reliance interest so far
as their individual civil liability for an unlawful search is concerned. The law must then pro-
vide that they are not civilly liable when they act in good faith, or that the public authority
that gives the instruction will protect them from personal liability. Were police held individ-
ually liable in such cases, they would surely redefine their duty for themselves accordingly.
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discussions of privacy leave obscure. In Jones v. United States,52 the
defendant was a casual, occasional user of the apartment of a friend.
Narcotics agents executing a search warrant entered the apartment,
from which the friend had been gone for some days, and searched
it in the defendant's presence. In a bird's nest outside a window,
they found narcotics and narcotics paraphernalia, for possession of
which the defendant was prosecuted. The Supreme Court held that
the government could not convict him by proving his possession and
at the same time require him to establish his possession as a basis for
challenging the search. "The possession on the basis of which peti-
tioner is to be and was convicted suffices to give him standing [to
make the challenge]. '53
The holding has led to supposition that there is a privacy of posses-
sion that the fourth amendment protects.54 As the facts of Jones
illustrate, the "possession" at stake is not literally having in one's
hand or on one's person, in which case the seizure and search of
the person would obviate any additional need to establish stand-
ing; rather, it is the extended possession of an item that one has
nearby and within his control. Jones's privacy of presence was in-
vaded. Privacy of presence does not depend at all on a possessory
interest; but in the circumstances of the case, the allegation of
possession depended on and therefore established Jones's pres-
ence. When, as in Jones, a person is arrested for a crime on the
52. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
53. Id. at 264. To some extent, the holding inJones was based on the perceptible unfair-
ness of allowing the government to take contradictory positions in the same case. To that ex-
tent, it has been questioned in Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973), where the Court
said that since "the self-incrimination dilemma, so central to the Jones decision" had been
eliminated by Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (which held that a defendant's
testimony in support of a motion to suppress evidence could not be admitted against him at
trial on the issue of guilt), it was an open question whether the automatic standing rule of
Jones was needed any longer. 411 U.S. at 228.
54. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), Justice Stewart, writing at that
point for three other members of the Court, said that the police could not seize items dis-
covered in plain view during a lawful search if they knew before they searched that the items
would be discovered. Id. at 470-73. Since the police are lawfully present in such circumstances,
it may appear that only possession of the items is protected by this rule. As the discussion in
the opinion makes clear, however, Justice Stewart's argument was based on the specific re-
quirement in the second clause of the fourth amendment that items to be seized be partic-
ularly described in a warrant. If the police make a lawful arrest that legitimates a search
without a warrant, they may seize items even though they expect to find them, as, for example,
in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). At one point, Justice Stewart extended his
analysis to legitimate warrantless searches, 403 U.S. at 471; but the extension was limited to
items that the police expect to find and do find in plain view outside the area of legitimate
search. See id. at 465 n.24, 482. As thus extended, the argument protects privacy of place,
not any possessory interest. Justice White discussed the issue at length in his opinion,
and disagreed sharply with Justice Stewart's reasoning. Id. at 510, 512-20.
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basis of current possession, unless the item was actually on his per-
son the charge must rest either on his presence when and where
the incriminating object was found or on his relation to the place.55
Without one or the other there would be no basis for the allegation
of possession.
In a situation in which neither privacy of presence nor privacy of
place is involved, a person's relationship to a seized item, however
incriminating, does not establish any interest in privacy that the
fourth amendment protects. The amendment does not prevent the
police from seizing a lost or mislaid item that they find on the street
or on a bus or in a bank, although it may incriminate the owner
and, for some purposes, may still be regarded as "in his posses-
sion. ' '56 Nor does possession confer protection if privacy of pres-
ence or privacy of place is overcome by another person's consent.
In Jones, for example, if the owner of the apartment had been
present and given his consent to the search, the defendant's objec-
tion would not have made a difference.57
The second troublesome situation was presented in Lewis v. United
States. 58 A police agent posed as a narcotics user to purchase narcot-
ics from the defendant. Had the purchase been made on the street,
as is usual, no fourth amendment question would have arisen. In
55. Past possession might of course be proved in a variety of ways. But the Jones rule
manifestly has no application to a case in which the police seize goods and the defendant is
prosecuted on the basis of possession that has terminated by the time of the seizure. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206, 223 (2d Cir. 1966); People v. Cefaro, 21 N.Y.2d 252,
287 N.Y.S.2d 371, 234 N.E.2d 423 (1967).
In United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951), police seized the defendant's narcotics,
which he had placed on the top shelf of a closet in his aunts' hotel room. He had a key to the
room and permission to use it at will, and he did use it often; but he did not have permission
to store narcotics there. The Court summarily rejected the claim that the defendant's privacy
had not been invaded. "The search and seizure," it said, "are.. . incapable of being untied."
Id. at 52. To the extent that the Court's cryptic explanation of defendant's standing indicated
more than momentary irritation with the requirement of standing, it rested on the defen-
dant's privacy of place in the premises, created by his access to and use of the room.
56. See, e.g., Long v. State, 33 Ala. App. 334, 33 So. 2d 382 (1948) (larceny of found
goods); State v. Courtsol, 89 Conn. 564, 94 A. 973 (1915) (same).
57. The courts have been most troubled by theJones rule in cases in which possession is
unlawfully acquired and creates privacy of place. That situation has arisen when the defen-
dant is in possession of a stolen car when he is arrested. E.g., Glisson v. United States, 406
F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1969) (stolen truck); Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir.
1965). In such cases, the defendant's standing to object to a search of the car has been up-
held. But see United States v. Kucinich, 404 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1968); cf. United States v.
Konigsberg, 336 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1964) (arrest in a garage). In these cases the significance
of privacy of place, albeit unlawfully acquired and temporary, is evident if one contrasts a
case in which the defendant is arrested in a car in which he is a hitchhiker. If the car's owner
consents to a search of the car, the hitchhiker's "possession" of narcotics that the police find
under the seat will not sustain an objection to the search.
58. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
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Lewis, the defendant invited the agent into his home, where the sale
was made. The Supreme Court held that no constitutionally pro-
tected right was violated. Neither Chief Justice Warren's opinion for
the Court nor Justice Brennan's brief concurring opinion is very
persuasive. They reflect more than anything else belief that such
practices are "essential" police work that must be allowed.
Since Lewis is an unusual case and the agent's testimony was not
different from what it would have been if the transaction had
occurred on the street, the Court's belief is easily accepted. But it
is not thinkable that we would allow the police to do the same thing
on a large scale. Suppose, for example, that the police deployed a
squad of men to pose as gas and electric company inspectors in
order to make a general survey of the contents of cellars. Plainly,
the fourth amendment would prohibit such a practice, notwith-
standing that the "inspector" was invited to enter in each case. We
do regard deliberate deception about an obviously material-in-
deed controlling-fact as inconsistent with voluntariness.
Neither of the majority opinions in Lewis uses the word "consent,"
which would have focused attention on the deceit by which the in-
vitation to enter was obtained; yet it is only on the basis of consent
that the agent's entry into the house might be justified.59 Lewis was
decided wrongly. The fourth amendment prohibits such an entry
whether the agent uncovers evidence or not. It is immaterial that
the evidence gathered as a consequence of the entry might have
been obtained lawfully outside the house.
The third situation arose in United States v. White, 6 0 in which the
Supreme Court upheld the admission in evidence of government
agents' testimony about the defendant's conversations with an in-
former. The conversations took place in the informer's home and
car, in a restaurant, and in the defendant's home, and were over-
heard by the agents mostly by means of a radio transmitter carried
by the informer. Both Justice White's plurality opinion and Justice
Harlan's forceful dissent focused on the element of electronic eaves-
dropping. Justice White insisted that if the informer's conduct and
59. Justice Brennan said that a person can "waive his right to privacy in the premises"
and does so "to the extent that he opens his home to the transaction of business and invites
anyone willing to enter to come in to trade with him. When his customer turns out to be a
government agent, the seller cannot, then, complain that his privacy has been invaded so long
as the agent does no more than buy his wares." Id. at 212, 213. Obviously, however, the agent
does do "more than buy his wares," and the defendant would not have permitted him to do
even that but for the deception. Underlying Justice Brennan's view, and also the view of the
majority, is the fact that the deception related to the defendant's unlawful purpose in admit-
ting the agent. It was deception nonetheless.
60. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
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revelations without electronic equipment would not have violated
the defendant's privacy protected by the fourth amendment, nei-
ther did that same conduct accompanied by instantaneous transmis-
sion and recording. "If the law gives no protection to the wrongdoer
whose trusted accomplice is or becomes a police agent, neither
should it protect him when that same agent has recorded or trans-
mitted the conversations which are later offered in evidence to
prove the State's case."'61 Justice Harlan objected that "third-party
bugging" made all the difference.
Were third-party bugging a prevalent practice, it might well
smother that spontaneity-reflected in frivolous, impetuous,
sacrilegious, and defiant discourse-that liberates daily life.
Much off-hand exchange is easily forgotten and one may count
on the obscurity of his remarks, protected by the very fact of a
limited audience, and the likelihood that the listener will either
overlook or forget what is said, as well as the listener's inability
to reformulate a conversation without having to contend with
a documented record. All these values are sacrificed by a rule of
law that permits official monitoring of private discourse limited
only by the need to locate a willing assistant. 62
While I agree with Justice Harlan's description of the conse-
quences of too much bugging, I cannot locate the basis for his
conclusion in the fourth amendment. Much that is "frivolous, im-
petuous, sacrilegious, and defiant" is without the amendment's pro-
tection. There is, for example, no right under that amendment not
to testify about what one has said or heard when it is any or all of
those things. The withholding of such information and much else
about oneself is indeed an aspect of privacy, and one of great im-
portance. But it is not one that the fourth amendment protects.
What is at stake in White, except for the conversations in the defen-
dant's home, is related to that privacy which is protected by the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination and, for different reasons, by the
first amendment. As the Court said elsewhere, "[T]he Fourth
Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional
'right to privacy.' . . . Other provisions of the Constitution protect
personal privacy from other forms of governmental invasion. ' 63
There is, of course, no way of proving thatJustice Harlan's appro-
priate fear of excessive bugging should not be reflected in the
61. Id. at 752.
62. Id. at 787-89 (footnotes omitted).
63. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
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fourth amendment. But there is no stronger argument for his con-
clusion than simply the importance of controlling bugging. As the
plurality opinion to the contrary shows, the opposing view is just as
easily supported by the belief that controlling bugging is not so im-
portant, at least when those who are bugged are criminals. It is that
kind of easy passage from conclusion to argument that has made
consistent application of the fourth amendment difficult. 64 Reason-
ing at large about "privacy," both the plurality and dissenting opin-
ions disregarded the difference between conversations outside the
defendant's home and conversations in his home which the in-
former was able to enter only by calculated deception. After Lewis,
their disregard is not surprising; but it was mistaken just the same. 65
II
If the fourth amendment's general requirement of reasonable-
ness were an independent condition for issuance of a search war-
rant, the grant or denial of a warrant would tell us something about
the nature and extent of the protected privacies; the criteria of rea-
sonableness within the protected areas would be an indication of the
areas' shape. Interpretation of the warrant clause has not followed
that course. According to the established view, the constitutional
64. Richard B. Parker has written critically of the result in White. See Parker, A Definition
of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275 (1974). He provides a definition of privacy that embraces
protection against an unwanted auditor whom one reasonably expects not to be there, and
concludes that the White situation is "in or out" of the fourth amendment according to the Su-
preme Court's balance between the needs of law enforcement and the loss of privacy. I have
no quarrel with Professor Parker's conclusion that privacy includes what he says it does. Else-
where in his article he helpfully indicates the multiformity of privacy. But he offers no justi-
fication for his move from privacy as such, or as he defines it, to the fourth amendment.
It is just that move that leads to the " 'tis-'tisn't" balancing of interests that characterizes
decisions in this area.
65. One might try to bring a prohibition against "wired informers" within the privacies
that the fourth amendment protects by treating the situation as an invasion of privacy of pres-
ence. The defendant in White intended to speak in the presence of one person, not several.
That argument fails, however, when applied to conversations in the informer's home and
car and in the restaurant, for the same reason that an objection to the informer himself
(because of his deceit) would fail. In the defendant's own home, the informer invaded
both his privacy of presence and privacy of place-pace Lewis-without regard to the
eavesdropping.
When a deceitful informer's own conduct is not a violation of privacy, the additional deceit
involved in his secret transmission of the conversation is not either. Another way of noticing
the same point is to consider whether an unwired informer's subsequent disclosure of a con-
versation (for example, as a witness in court) is an invasion of fourth amendment privacy
independent of whatever invasion may have occurred from his (deceitful) participation in
the conversation. All agree that it is not, even if the speaker always intended that his
words not be repeated elsewhere. Justice Harlan's emphasis on the "off-handedness" of
casual speech rather than the privacy of protected speech was correct.
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protection is wholly overcome whenever the express requirements
of substance (probable cause and particularity) and form (an oath)
are met. Police can obtain a warrant to search as readily to recover
the fruits of a petty larceny as to discover a murder weapon, and
without regard to the availability of other adequate evidence. Nor is
any distinction made, from the individual's perspective, according
to the place to be searched; with a warrant, police can search a bed-
room or a dresser drawer or a locked desk as readily as a living
room or brief case. Constitutionally, there are no degrees of privacy.
Nothing in the language of tjie fourth amendment requires so
unitary a solution. Yet among current and recent members of the
Supreme Court, only Justice Douglas seems to have perceived the
possibility and value of a more discriminating approach.66 Part of
the explanation for the general failure even to consider that ap-
proach is no doubt the constantly shifting relationship between the
amendment's two clauses, which has focused attention on when the
need for a warrant can be avoided and not on what might be re-
quired beyond probable cause when a warrant is obtained.
At one time it appeared that the law might develop differently.
The Supreme Court once declared that a search warrant could not
be used to gain entry to a man's house "solely for the purpose of
making search to secure evidence to be used against him in a crimi-
nal or penal proceeding .... ,67 Such a search, the Court said, would
be unreasonable, although a comparable search to accomplish cer-
tain other governmental objectives-to seize contraband or the in-
strumentalities of crime-would not be. Had that reasoning been
pursued, it might readily have developed into more general require-
ments of reasonableness for issuance of a warrant. If the purpose of
a search was relevant generally, so might be the need for evidence in
a particular case and the extent of the invasion that would be re-
quired.
Almost immediately, however, many courts routinely avoided the
prohibition on searches for "mere evidence" by accepting some
other governmental objective as a pretext for an evidentiary search.
With a little imagination, there is scarcely anything of evidentiary
significance that cannot be described as an instrument or fruit of the
66. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 312 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting). He
argued there that the fourth amendment creates "a zone of privacy that may not be invaded
by the police through raids, by the legislators through laws, or by the magistrates through
the issuance of warrants," id. at 313, as well as another less sacrosanct zone that is subject to
these invasions. In the former category, he said, are "books, pamphlets, papers, letters, docu-
ments, and other personal effects." Id. at 321. He rejected the notion that the fourth amend-
ment creates places that are sanctuaries. Id.
67. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921).
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crime. 68 The "mere evidence" rule, as it was called, was misapplied
to searches that were justified without a warrant (as to which, there-
fore, the rule's limitation of the grounds for issuance of a warrant
was irrelevant). In such cases, courts recognized that it made little
sense to limit the seizure of evidence; since the search was not there-
by limited in any way and there was no protection in the fourth
amendment against a seizure of property as such; the government
would lose the use of the evidence without any compensating gain
of individual privacy. The application of the rule in such cases-
largely theoretical, since it was almost always found not to apply to
the facts of the case-was the stimulus that led the courts to under-
value and finally to undo it. In 1967, the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that the rule was honored in form but ignored in practice
and, with scant attention to its original purpose, abandoned it.69
The requirement that an application for a warrant state particu-
larly the intended scope of a search is just that; one must be particu-
lar, but only because general searches are prohibited. There need be
no assessment of the worth of the particular search, and ordinarily
there is none. While there is nothing reassuring about the Court's
failure even to consider constitutional premises that would discrimi-
nate among searches, much can be said for uncomplicated insistence
on the broad principle prohibiting general searches; much emphasis
on particulars might obscure the basic principle in the fourth
amendment. Magistrates who issue warrants are not likely to be able
or willing to make refined judgments that balance competing public
and private needs.
No such doubts could be raised against a nonconstitutional, ad-
ministrative rule. Whether the Constitution allows them to do so or
not, the police should not search unless the public purpose out-
weighs the private interests. The procedure for obtaining a warrant
contains the means for implementing that principle. The value of
the procedure is not that we gain the judgment of a "neutral and de-
tached magistrate," as the Supreme Court likes to say.70 Typically,
68. In one case, for example, a bank robber's shoes were described as an instrumentality
of the crime because they facilitated his getaway and because a shod robber "would not at-
tract as much public attention as a robber fleeing barefooted from the scene of the hold-up."
United States v. Guido, 251 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1958).
69. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). The Court said, with respect to the distinc-
tion among the reasons for a search expressed in Gouled: "[T]he prevention of crime is
served at least as much by allowing the Government to identify and capture the criminal, as
it is by allowing the seizure of his instrumentalities." Id. at 306 n. 11.
70. The repeatedly quoted phrase is from Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14
(1948).Johnson was one of several cases (decided at about the same time) that affirmed the
importance of the warrant procedure. See also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451
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the magistrate is neither detached nor very competent; and he is
dependent for his information and his judgment on the police and
the prosecutor. Just the same, adherence to the procedure obliges
the police to deliberate before making a search, to determine in ad-
vance how wide the search will be, and to articulate the reason for
the search with some specificity. The police might be required also,
on a nonconstitutional basis, to state in advance their conclusion that
the need to search outweighs the intrusion, and to give reasons for
the conclusion if they are not obvious. No doubt such statements
would often be boilerplate. But sometimes they would not; how seri-
ously the police responded to such a requirement would depend on
how seriously we took their responses. In any event, even boilerplate
offers some protection.
The remaining questions about searches on a warrant are mostly
technical. Although the words of the Constitution make these
searches seem the most usual, they are in fact exceptional, because
so many occasions in which a search without a warrant is allowed
occur in regular police work. The verbal formulation of the test of
probable cause has not changed and is probably about as good as we
can devise.7 1 So long as there is a separation between investigative
and prosecutorial (or magisterial) officials, the former deciding
what is useful to an investigation and the latter what is proper to it,
the warrant procedure is probably about as good as we can have it.
Constitutional doctrines that allow the police to search without a
warrant even if a warrant could practicably have been obtained-
the doctrines discussed in the next section-needlessly deprive us of
the benefits of advance determinations. If those doctrines are pre-
served at the constitutional level, there should be an administrative
requirement that warrants be obtained. And when it is not practica-
ble to obtain one in advance, the officer who makes the search
should be required to justify it promptly afterwards.
III
The ambiguous relationship between the fourth amendment's
two clauses has been resolved largely by creation of a large class of
(1948); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948). The Supreme Court has relied more
on what these cases said than on what they did. See generally text and notes at notes 72-100
infra.
71. The standard formula, derived from Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162
(1925), is that there is probable cause if" 'the facts and circumstances within [the arresting
officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] suf-
ficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has
been or is being committed." Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959).
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cases in which a search without a warrant is constitutionally "reason-
able" and therefore permitted. The most important category is
searches "incident to an arrest." Conceived narrowly as the au-
thority of an arresting police officer to protect himself and prevent
an escape, such a search might be considered truly incidental to
the arrest and not an event requiring independent justification.
Although the "incident" rubric does draw on the close connection
with an arrest, it has not been limited by that narrow conception.
Until recently, the leading case was United States v. Rabinowitz, 72 in
which the Supreme Court held that, after arresting the defendant
in his office on a charge of dealing in forged stamps, the police
could search his office, desk, safe, and filing cabinets for one and a
half hours to find the stamps. Since the search was for particular
items in a particular place, and the police presumably had probable
cause to believe that the stamps were there, the search was not the
kind of general search that the amendment prohibits. But it was also
just the sort of search for which a warrant is typically required. Had
Rabinowitz not been present when the police arrived, they could not
have made the same search without a warrant. As Justice Frank-
furter pointed out in dissent, simply labeling the search an "inci-
dent" of an arrest to which it was functionally unrelated did not
overcome the difficulty.7 3 In the wake of Rabinowitz, some lower
courts all but ignored the warrant clause whenever the police had
made a related arrest.7 4
Nineteen years after Rabinowitz, in 1969, the Supreme Court
turned the tide, but weakly. In Chimel v. California,75 it declared that
after a person was arrested, the arresting officer could search him
for weapons or means of escape. "Otherwise, the officer's safety
might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. '76 The
Court went on:
In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in
order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area
into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon
or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule.
A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested
72. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
73. Id. at 68.
74. E.g., Robinson v. United States, 327 F.2d 618 (8th Cir. 1964) (search of four-room
apartment, including suitcases, drawers, etc.); Leahy v. United States, 272 F.2d 487 (9th Cir.
1959) (search of entire house).
75. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
76. Id. at 763.
1974)
The University of Chicago Law Review
can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in
the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification,
therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area
"within his immediate control"--construing that phrase to
mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.
There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely
searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs-
or, for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers
or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.7 7
The Court's functional connection between an arrest and an
incidental search for weapons and means of escape was not main-
mined when the Court considered searches for evidence. The
danger that evidence might be destroyed is not ordinarily a basis
for dispensing with a search warrant; indeed, in Chimel itself, the
Supreme Court rejected Justice White's argument in dissent that
police must be allowed to search the premises thoroughly because
confederates-Chimel's wife was at home when the arrest oc-
curred-might destroy evidence. 8 Why should an arrest make all
the difference for evidence that the arrested person himself might
destroy? More generally, the police do not obviously need un-
restricted authority to search the area within a person's "imme-
diate control" in order to arrest him. To conduct the search, they
will have to control the man; and if they do, why do they need to
search? So far as "the area" is concerned, why can't the police often
just remove the man?
Nevertheless, Chimel did impose some limitations on an "inci-
dental" search. In Vale v. Louisiana,7 9 decided the following year, the
police arrested the defendant in front of his home. Fearing that
members of his family would destroy evidence, they entered the
house and seized narcotics they found there. Relying on Chimel, the
Supreme Court reversed the conviction. The matter was muddied
considerably by Chambers v. Maroney,80 decided with Vale. Respond-
ing to the radio report of a robbery, police stopped a car and arrested
the occupants. They searched the car after it had been removed to
police headquarters. Plainly, the justifications for a search given in
Chimel were inapplicable. But the Court concluded that the police
77. Id.
78. Justice White's argument is at 395 U.S. 770, 774-75, to which the Court responded
(summarily) at 764-65.
79. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
80. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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could have searched the car on the spot; and, having probable cause
to believe that there was seizable evidence in it, they could have im-
pounded it at the police station until a warrant was obtained. The
Court said there was little difference between impounding the car
till a warrant was obtained and searching it immediately without a
warrant. 81 The conviction was affirmed.
Could the police have "impounded" Chimel's house or Vale's
house until a warrant was obtained, lest evidence be destroyed in the
meantime? The danger was greater in those cases than in Chambers,
since there were members of the arrested person's family on the
premises; in Chambers, all the persons in the car were in custody, the
car had been impounded, and no one had appeared to claim it.
There is no suggestion in the two house cases that "securing" the
houses temporarily would have been proper; indeed, there is a sug-
gestion in Chambers that it would not, even if an unforeseeable need
had arisen. 82 Yet, aside from the observation that "for the purposes
of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional difference be-
tween houses and cars,"83 the Court did not distinguish the two
situations.
If one took seriously the Court's statement that there is a "consti-
tutional difference between houses and cars" that does not depend
on the functional necessities of police work, that would support the
otherwise rejected doctrine of degrees of privacies. 84 The lesser con-
stitutional protection of cars would reflect the fact that they are less
private places than houses. Many people resort to their cars, how-
81. "For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing
and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the
other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to
search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 52. In his dissent,
id. at 64, Justice Harlan observed:
Even where no arrests are made, persons who wish to avoid a search--either to protect
their privacy or to conceal incriminating evidence-will almost certainly prefer a brief
loss of the use of the vehicle in exchange for the opportunity to have a magistrate pass
upon the justification for the search. To be sure, one can conceive of instances in which
the occupant, having nothing to hide and lacking concern for the privacy of the auto-
mobile, would be more deeply offended by a temporary immobilization of his vehicle
than by a prompt search of it. However, such a person always remains free to consent
to an immediate search, thus avoiding any delay. Where consent is not forthcoming, the
occupants of the car have an interest in privacy that is protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment even where the circumstances justify a temporary seizure.... The Court's endorse-
ment of a warrantless invasion of that privacy where another course would suffice is
simply inconsistent with our repeated stress on the Fourth Amendment's mandate of
" 'adherence to judicial processes.' "E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 357.
82. "The same consequences may not follow where there is unforeseeable cause to search
a house." 399 U.S. at 52.
83. Id.
84. See text and note at note 66 supra.
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ever, for a privacy of presence and a privacy of place that they lack
in crowded living conditions. Nothing that the Court said in Cham-
bers overcomes that fact.
More recently, the Court has offered a different reason why
searches of cars may be allowed without warrants: "Because of the
extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic, and also because
of the frequency with which a vehicle can become disabled or in-
volved in an accident on public highways, the extent of police-citizen
contact involving automobiles will be substantially greater than po-
lice-citizen contact in a home or office. ' 85 Although the Court men-
tioned that the noncriminal "police-citizen contact" involving auto-
mobiles may bring evidence of crime into police officers' "plain
view,' 86 in the actual case the police found evidence by searching
the locked trunk of a car after it had been towed to a privately
owned service station, while the defendant who had been driving
the car was in the hospital. There was no indication that anyone
would try to enter the car before a warrant could be obtained or
that the police thought about obtaining a warrant at all. The Court
finally defended its conclusion that the search was reasonable in an-
other way:
The Framers of the Fourth Amendment have given us only the
general standard of "unreasonableness" as a guide in determin-
ing whether searches and seizures meet the standard of that
Amendment in those cases where a warrant is not required.
Very little that has been said in our previous decisions ... and
very little that we might say here can usefully refine the lan-
guage of the Amendment itself in order to evolve some detailed
formula for judging cases such as this. 87
Given the Court's approach to the problem, its despair of convincing
anyone who disagreed with the result was justified.
In 1973, Chimel's would-be functional approach to searches accom-
panying an arrest was undermined openly in two traffic-arrest cases,
United States v. Robinson88 and Gustafson v. Florida.89 In both, the de-
fendant was arrested for driving without a license and was searched
thoroughly. The Court upheld the searches without any showing
that the arresting officers thought a search was necessary to effect
85. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
86. Id. at 442.
87. Id. at 448.
88. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
89. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
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the arrest safely; there plainly was no evidence of the crime for
which they were arrested that might be destroyed, nor was there an
indication that they might destroy evidence of other crimes. The
connection that the Court had made in Chimel between the arrest
and the search was discarded: "This general exception [to the war-
rant requirement] has historically been formulated into two distinct
propositions. The first is that a search may be made of the person
of the arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest. The second is that a
search may be made of the area within the control of the arrestee." 90
Only the second proposition, the Court said, had ever been "subject
to differing interpretations." 91 Although the reasonableness of a
search of the person derived generally from the need to effect the
arrest, the assumed connection did not have to be present in a par-
ticular case or even class of cases, like traffic arrests. "[A]ll custodial
arrests [are] alike for purposes of search justification. '92
Given the ambiguities, not to say casual shifts, in the Supreme
Court's doctrinal announcements, it is not surprising that lower
courts take their directions from above less than seriously. Chimel
deflated Rabinowitz, but it has not been immune from being inflated
and devalued itself. Purporting to rely on Chimel, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that FBI agents who had
arrested a person lying on a mattress in his apartment could search
a wallet inside a cigar box on a table next to the mattress. 93 The Sixth
Circuit held that after about eight narcotics agents had arrested a
man in his apartment, ordered him to stand against a wall, and
"secured" him with a belt, one of the agents could search a closed
drawer in a table "three to five feet" from where the man had been
directed to stand. 94 And the New York Court of Appeals, concluding
that the "grabbable area" under Chimel did not really depend on the
arrested person's ability to grab anything, held that the area in-
cluded a closet in which the arrested person had been hiding, after
he had been taken out of the closet, handcuffed, and removed from
the room.95 And so forth. For all its statements, and there have been
many, the Supreme Court has not advanced on the issue that di-
vided the Court in Rabinowitz. All one can say is that, for the mo-
ment, the see-saw between the two clauses of the amendment is
tilted away from the warrant clause.
90. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 235.
93. United States v. Harrison, 461 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1972).
94. United States v. Becker, 485 F.2d 51, 53 (6th Cir. 1973).
95. People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793, 300 N.E.2d 139 (1973).
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Last term the Supreme Court marked out another large category
of searches that are reasonable and constitutionally permitted with-
out a warrant. Once a person "is lawfully arrested and is in custody,
the effects in his possession at the place of detention that were sub-
ject to search at the time and place of his arrest may lawfully be
searched and seized without a warrant even though a substantial
period of time has elapsed between the arrest and subsequent ad-
ministrative processing on the one hand and the taking of property
for use as evidence on the other. ' 96 In the actual case, United States v.
Edwards, the defendant had been arrested at around 11:00 p.m. for
an attempt to break into a post office. The next morning, he was
given other clothes and his own clothes were taken as evidence; his
clothing, which had on it paint chips that matched the paint on the
post office, was admitted in evidence. The majority insisted that the
police, who had probable cause to examine the clothing, had acted
reasonably; four dissenting Justices insisted that no warrant had
been obtained. Both propositions were correct. The opinion of the
Court resolved the issue, but only by a headcount-and that, indeed,
by only one vote.
The apparent conclusion of the majority in Edwards is that a 'Jail-
house search" is lawful, at least unless there are peculiar aggravating
circumstances. 97 More is involved in the question than appears from
the Court's rather casual conclusion that it is reasonable to search a
person in jail. The "search" of possessions that a person carries with
him can be a means for imposing one's will on him and making it
clear to him that he is not in control. The contents of a wallet can be
spread out on a table, handled, commented on ("Who's this babe?"
"Whatcha got his picture for?"), and sullied. Items that are intimate
not intrinsically but because of long, familiar association can be ex-
posed. Nothing about an arrest makes such an exercise of authority
incidental or reasonable; the need to inventory personal property
or maintain security in cells requires only that the property be
placed in a locker by the person himself. Given that a jailed person
is already profoundly subject to the state's exercise of authority and
often force, it is particularly important to avoid needless additional
subjection.
Searches incident to an arrest, and other searches based on excep-
tions to the warrant clause, are typically threats to privacy of place;
one way or another, the police are legitimately present. In Robinson,
96. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807 (1974).
97. See id. at 808 n.9.
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Justice Powell demonstrated how devastating the failure to distin-
guish the two kinds of privacy can be. He observed:
I believe that an individual lawfully subjected to a custodial ar-
rest retains no significant Fourth Amendment interest in the
privacy of his person. Under this view the custodial arrest is the
significant intrusion of state power into the privacy of one's per-
son. If the arrest is lawful, the privacy interest guarded by the
Fourth Amendment is subordinated to a legitimate and over-
riding governmental concern. No reason then exists to frustrate
law enforcement by requiring some independent justification
for a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest. This seems to
me the reason that a valid arrest justifies a full search of the per-
son, even if that search is not narrowly limited by the twin ra-
tionales of seizing evidence and disarming the arrestee. The
search incident to arrest is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment because the privacy interest protected by that con-
stitutional guarantee is legitimately abated by the fact of
arrest.98
Even though privacy of presence is "legitimately abated," the items
carried on one's person may reveal an important aspect of privacy
that the arrest itself left untouched.
It is well known that in practice searches on a warrant are the ex-
ception rather than the rule. The extent to which the Court has
made the warrant procedure exceptional even doctrinally is ob-
scured by its unwillingness or inability to frame and test any general
principles. The tendency has been to treat each situation in which
the police are lawfully present for some reason other than to search
as a separate category, which is exempt from the warrant clause if
there is a general likelihood that something will be found. That ap-
proach limits the requirement of a warrant to the small number of
cases in which government officials plan to initiate contact with the
person for the primary purpose of making a search.
When contact is unplanned, as in many police encounters, there
may be strong reasons to make some kind of search and no oppor-
tunity to obtain a warrant. An arresting officer's responsibility to
protect himself and effect the arrest often gives such reasons. So also
there are circumstances in which a search of an automobile or a
search of possessions at a jail or some other search without a warrant
is manifestly necessary. But legitimation of broad categories of war-
rantless search, unrelated either to the circumstances that make a
98. 414 U.S. 218, 237-38 (1973) (concurring opinion) (footnotes omitted).
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search necessary or to the opportunity to obtain a warrant, violates
the fourth amendment's basic prohibition against general searches.
Situations like "arrest,". "contact with automobiles," and "detention
in jail" are far too common, more so for some portions of the popu-
lation than others, for us to exempt them wholesale from the re-
quirement of a warrant. Of course, we cannot ask that policemen
calibrate their conduct with precision if circumstances require them
to act swiftly, forcefully, and often dangerously; but that hard real-
ity does not justify broad rules that make it immaterial whether
such circumstances are present or not.
The current approach of the Court separates the two clauses of
the fourth amendment and treats the warrant clause as a narrow,
isolated prescription. The link between the clauses, however, is that
they share and work together toward the common purpose of pro-
hibiting general searches. Warrantless searches in the criminal con-
text should be permitted if (1) a search is manifestly necessary to
accomplish a legitimate governniental objective other than criminal
investigation; and (2) the definition of the necessity serves the main
purpose of the warrant procedure, to avoid general searches; and
(3) the search is strictly limited to the necessity; and (4) a warrant
could not reasonably have been obtained.
In Warden v. Hayden, 99 police received a report minutes after an
armed robbery that the robber had been followed and seen entering
a house. They went directly to the house and knocked. They told the
woman who answered the door why they were there and asked to
search. She did not object. The police spread through the house
and found the robber in a bedroom on the second floor. In such a
situation, the first concern of the police is not criminal investigation
as such but, as keepers of the peace, to take control of the situation,
apprehend the robber, prevent harm to others, and restore order.
The urgency of those tasks did not permit them to wait to enter until
a warrant could be obtained; but reference to the necessity for the
search accomplishes the purpose of the warrant clause. The Su-
preme Court concluded correctly that in the "exigencies of the situ-
ation" the warrantless entry and search for the robber and weapons
or means of escape did not violate the fourth amendment. 100
99. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
100. Id. at 298. Since the search for weapons and means of escape preceded the robber's
arrest, it could not have been justified as simply an incident of the arrest, even if that excep-
tion were given broad scope. But if the search for the man is justified by the need to arrest,
so is the search for weapons and means of escape by which the arrest could be prevented.
On the other hand, a search for evidence cannot be regarded as a means of controlling the
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IV
The structure of the fourth amendment depends on individual
access to or possession of private property, from which privacy of
presence and privacy of place arise. Up to now, we have considered
only the division of property between "mine and thine" and no-
body's (or everybody's)-between private and public property. In
everyday life there is no such clear division. We are accustomed to
being "in public" while on private property: in a supermarket, in a
moviehouse, or at a baseball game. Such privately owned places
must admit all persons under equal conditions and pursue a rational
and socially acceptable policy of admission and exclusion, which
makes them "private" in a sense very different from, say, the privacy
of one's home. We are accustomed also to being "partly" in public-
in a telephone booth, for example, where we can be seen but not
easily heard. In Katz v. United States, °'0 the Supreme Court con-
firmed the constitutional relevance of such incomplete privacies.
Increasingly, we are accustomed to being private in public places.
In urban areas, in which people spend large portions of time mov-
ing in crowds from one more or less private place to another, and
many people are more or less in public most of the day-in offices,
stores, and so forth-one becomes accustomed to substituting ano-
nymity for privacy. In those conditions, the preservation of auton-
omy does not depend on being unobserved, which is impossible,
but on being an unidentified member of a large mass. One is ob-
actions of a man who has not yet been apprehended. On that score, the Court was disingen-
uous and unpersuasive. A police officer who found incriminating clothing in a washing ma-
chine in the basement-the robber was later arrested on the second floor-testified that he
was looking for the "man or the money." Just the same (1), the Court said, it would infer that
he was "also looking for weapons," id. at 299-300, and therefore it need not decide whether
an evidentiary search would have been proper. A more straightforward approach would be
to acknowledge that when police are making a rapid search of strange premises in pursuit
of an armed robber, they cannot be expected to measure their actions very finely; so'long as
there is no indication that they are deliberately taking advantage of the situation to carry out
a search that they otherwise could not make, the fruits of their action are properly obtained.
In retrospect, it may have been foolish for the police officer to look in the washing machine
for the man or weapons; but unreflective actions of that kind are typical of hasty conduct
in dangerous circumstances.
Whether Hayden established a general principle for searches in "exigent circumstances"
or is limited to cases of hot pursuit is unclear. One year earlier, the Court had upheld com-
pulsory blood tests of drivers arrested without a warrant, where there was a clear indication
that evidence of drunk driving would be found but would vanish before a warrant could be
obtained. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). The Court has not otherwise pro-
gressed towards a general principle, but lower courts have done so, mostly on the authority
of Hayden. See, e.g., United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1972); Dorman v.
United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
101. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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served, but the observation is fleeting and unrecorded; and it is not
attached to one's identity and made part of his history.
Too rigid reliance on the distinction between private and public
places may serve us poorly in this context. Local officials have occa-
sionally used "monitoring" devices like closed-circuit television to
maintain surveillance over a large area like a public square-tem-
porarily when a disturbance is expected or permanently if disturb-
ances are frequent. 10 2 It is easy to regard such strategies as no more
than the efficient use of technology; what two-hundred men could
do by swamping the area is done more safely and less obtrusively by
ten men with a few cameras and police cars. Since the fourth amend-
ment appears not to prohibit the police from sending in lots of men,
there appears to be no objection to doing the same thing with tech-
nology. Suppose, however, that in an attempt finally to end mug-
gings in Central Park, New York City put the whole park "on tele-
vision" from dusk to dawn, with radio-advised troopers ready to
swoop down on signal. The park might be abandoned not only by
the muggers, but also by lovers holding hands in secret or just in pri-
vate, friends wanting to talk intimately with one another, an artist
wanting to paint or think "to himself," people doing all sorts of inno-
cent things they would not do on television. 103 Were this practice ex-
tended to other parks, all parks, and finally all public streets, the
quality of life in the city would be profoundly affected, albeit with-
out invasion of private property. Occasional technological surveil-
lance of public places for a specific purpose is less threatening
precisely because it is occasional; but privacy has temporal and cir-
cumstantial as well as geographic dimensions.
A comparable problem arises from another source. It is increas-
ingly common for television cameras to observe and record everyone
who enters private places like apartment houses or office buildings,
and for cameras to record everyday transactions in banks, at super-
market checkout counters, and so forth. 0 4 Some department stores
apparently use cameras to prevent thefts by observing people in
dressing rooms. It is easy again to regard these devices simply as
102. The New York Times reported, for example, that New York was using a closed-
circuit television system to monitor the Times Square area. N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1973, at
37, col. 1. The Valley News (Lebanon, N.H.) reported that the Chief of Police of Wind-
sor, Vermont, had made his second (unsuccessful) bid for funds to monitor the streets
by closed-circuit television. Valley News, July 13, 1972, at 1.
103. Of course, the same people may avoid the park now for a different reason: fear
of being mugged.
104. The New York City Police Department established a program to subsidize the in-
stallation of surveillance cameras in 3600 stores on major thoroughfares. N.Y. Times, Oct.
10, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
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technological advances over "limitations" of human vision, not too
unlike the large mirrors on public buses, to which we are all accus-
tomed, by which the driver can observe anyone who might try to
slip on or off without paying. Since the premises are private-that
is, privately owned-and the observations made for private pur-
poses, we are led to assume that what the fourth amendment protects
is not at stake.
Technological surveillance that transcends the limits of the
human body is not merely more efficient than "human" investiga-
tion. The aspects of privacy that are part of the pattern of our lives
depend on our knowledge of human limitations. There is no neces-
sity that observation be limited by the capacities of the human eye
and ear. Those limits are contingent and can be extended by man's
technical virtuosity. But if we do so, our attitudes and finally our
behavior will be affected. It is a risky business to speculate how hu-
man beings will adapt to a changed environment. Without being
very precise, experience suggests that if we were to lose the cloak of
anonymity in public places, we should be less open, more crafty,
more secretive, and more isolated than we are now. There is no way
to establish that our behavior now is better (more "natural," or more
"human," or more pleasant) than it would be if we expected and had
less privacy. In the end, we must rely on an unproved vision of man
in society.
The matter of telephonic wiretapping illustrates the point. Al-
though my perception of the fourth amendment as an expansive
text and my understanding of its purpose lead me to conclude that
private telephonic conversations are among our protected "effects,"
I cannot offer a decisive argument that the original decision to the
contrary, 0 5 now overruled, was wrong. Given that telephones ap-
peared rather recently in the course of human history, I cannot in-
sist that it is "natural" or "essential" that men be able to speak to one
another over great distances in private. I can, however, point out
the consequences of unprivate telephone conversations. Suppose it
were announced that all telephone conversations from an even-
numbered hour to an odd-numbered hour-6-7, 8-9, 10-11, etc.-
would be recorded and reviewed by public officials. We should not
be surprised to find a great shift in telephone use toward the odd-
numbered hours.
The ability to transmit voices electronically over long distances,
and then the ability to intercept such transmissions and eavesdrop
105. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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on conversations without a trespass on the place where either the
speaker or listener was located, led us to abandon physical tres-
pass as an essential element of a constitutional violation. If, from
our present vantage, a trespass seems obviously not essential, we
should recognize that formerly it seemed just as obvious that it
was. Similarly, the ability that technology gives us to observe large
areas efficiently and unobtrusively requires us again to develop a
more subtle understanding of the privacy that the fourth amend-
ment protects. It is privacy of presence that is most jeopardized
by such technology. If in the conditions of modern life anonymity
has become the only means for privacy of presence in much of our
lives, then we should reflect carefully before we allow incursions
on it by unseen observers and recorders. It may make little differ-
erence to the outcome whether the incursion extends to a "pri-
vate" place open to the public or a "public" place where people go
to be in private.
Formerly it was sufficient to reject (or extend metaphorically) the
notion of trespass because the overheard parties themselves re-
mained "in private." If we are to preserve anonymity in public as
an aspect of privacy, it will be necessary to reconsider the distinc-
tion between public and private places. 10 6 Until now, the courts
have been willing to extend the concept of a private place only to
places like a public telephone booth'07 or toilet facility,' 0 8 where
the physical arrangements create an expectation of privacy. The
larger and more difficult step will be to move beyond the element
of "place" altogether and consider the privacy that one expects
while anonymously "in public" in private or public places.
Serious reconsideration of privacy of place would raise issues at
another level. As long as one can plausibly urge that there are no
societal, institutional barriers to realization of the American dream,
so that acquisition of one's own private place is dependent-in a
meaningful sense-on oneself, restriction of the fourth amend-
ment's scope to the privacy that one has achieved otherwise is con-
sistent with, if not required by, the values that the amendment pro-
tects. But if one believes that the society creates-or accepts, or
simply includes within its definition-barriers to such acquisition,
on the basis of race or wealth or any factors not within one's control,
106. This reconsideration would have a different basis and therefore would lead to dif-
ferent results from those urged by Justice Harlan in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,
768 (1971) (dissenting opinion). See text and notes at notes 62-64 supra.
107. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
108. E.g., People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973). But
see Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965).
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then it is not consistent with the protected values to afford privacy
of place only according to private ownership of property. It is a far
remove from the present or historical application of the fourth
amendment to find in it a commitment to public provision of hous-
ing. According to one view of contemporary American society,
that is where the amendment leads.
The privacy secured by the fourth amendment fosters large social
interests. Political and moral discussion, affirmation and dissent,
need places to be born and nurtured, and shelter from unwanted
publicity. So do economic and aesthetic creation and enterprise. It
would misconceive the great purpose of the amendment to see it
primarily as the servant of other social goods, however large and
generally valuable. What the fourth amendment protects above all
is the conduct of ordinary lives.
